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This paper presents a model of reinsurance market spirals, and applies it to the
situation that existed in the Lloyd’s and London reinsurance markets in the second half
of the 1980s.  It shows that the key contributory factors - a tendency for retrocession
business to be placed and remain within the market, low retentions,  underwriters’
misjudgements regarding their exposure coupled with failures to purchase sufficient
reinsurance to protect accounts against known exposures, and an irrational premium
structure in the catastrophe reinsurance and retrocession markets - were all present in
the London Market at the time.
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Between 1987 and 1990 world insurance markets were impacted by  a  series of major
catastrophes, including inter alia North European storms (1987),  the destruction of
the Piper Alpha oil platform and Hurricane Gilbert (1988), the San Francisco
earthquake, Hurricane Hugo and the grounding of the Exxon Valdez tanker (1989)
and  further North European storms (1990).   Though not necessarily unforeseeable,  a
series of losses on this scale was in fact highly unlikely.
2  Insurers in the London
Market in general and Lloyd’s in particular suffered serious losses
3.
As a major insurance market, specialising in catastrophe insurance,  Lloyd’s was bound
to carry a significant share of the losses.  However, Lloyd’s insurers’  share appears to
have been considerably greater than their normal share of catastrophe insurance
business
4.  The abnormally high share reflected a heightened exposure to risk that was
intimately connected with the “spirals” that existed in the London excess of loss (XL)
insurance market at the time -   the genesis, nature and implications of which were not
well understood by many of the professionals working in the Lloyd’s insurance
market
5.
The objects of this paper are, first,  to model the processes involved in insurance
market spirals and  analyse the incidence of loss amongst the reinsurers concerned
6;
                                               
1 I am indebted to Bob Carter, Gerda Dewit, Paul Fenn and  Robin Milne for comments on an earlier
draft of this article.  The usual disclaimers apply.
2Mr Harold Clarke of  Bacon & Woodrow, a firm of actuaries,  calculated that, taking a cut-off of
$500m per loss, the likelihoods of experiencing losses greater than those that actually occurred in
each of the years 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 were 1 in 3, 1 in 20, 1 in 125, and 1 in 47 respectively.
[Phillips (1994) p 128].
3 For the period 1989-92  Chatset have estimated that certain Lloyd’s syndicates incurred  losses of
some £3.5 billion from this kind of business .  [Cresswell (1996), p.103].
4 See Phillips (1994),  p. 12 and Walker (1992), p. 9.  Lloyd’s is estimated to have carried 55 per
cent of the total loss arising from Piper Alpha, and for the North European storms in 1987 and 1990
and for Hurricane Hugo in 1989 the corresponding figures were 31 per cent, 36 per cent and 36 per
cent respectively.  An independent estimate of Lloyd’s likely exposure to losses in the event of a major
US storm in 1984 put the corresponding figure at only 15.1 per cent. [AIRAC (1986), table 14, p.23.]
5 “Not all specialist underwriters were aware in 1987 of the ‘spiral’”, and  “Even the underwriters
engaged in LMX  (London Market Excess of Loss business) did not fully understand the effect of the
spiral.”  See Gatehouse (1994), p. 18
6 I am not aware of any model of insurance market spirals in the generally accessible literature.  The
only attempt to construct a formal model that I have found is in Institute of Actuaries (1988), 1,
which includes tables and graphs based upon a similar, but simpler, model.2
and secondly, by applying the model to the situation that existed at Lloyd’s, to show
why Lloyd’s syndicates were exposed to such serious losses when the catastrophes
occurred.
1.2 Risk-bearing and risk dispersal in the insurance industry
Insurance market spirals arise from the interplay of  practices employed by the
insurance industry to disperse risk and spread it across insurers with the financial
resources to carry it.  Key elements are:
• the subscription (or co-insurance) method as a means of placing large risks;
• XL reinsurance as a means of laying off risk;
• the practice of purchasing XL reinsurance in “layers”;
• and the necessity for underwriters to estimate their “Probable Maximum Loss” 
(PML)
7 when determining their need for XL reinsurance cover.
An insurer’s ability to bear risk is governed by its capital resources - the risks
underwritten must not be so large as to absorb more than the insurer’s available capital
in the event of a claim being made.  In practice insurers try to ensure that the claims
arising from a single event are unlikely to absorb more than a fraction of the available
capital support. This means that large
8 single risks, or the risk of large claims arising
from single events, must be distributed across a considerable number of insurers, each
bearing only a fraction of the total risk.
The dispersal, or “pulverisation”,  of risk is achieved by two methods:
• The subscription method enables individual primary insurers to subscribe for a
proportion of the total risk, with subscribers being sought until cover has been
provided for the total risk.  Large risks are normally placed in this way.
• Primary insurers commonly subscribe for a larger share of  a risk than they can
safely retain for their own account, and reinsurance provides a means for them to
transfer part of the risk that  they accept  to other insurers, thus increasing the pool of
capital available to support the risk. Further capital support may be obtained  through
retrocession, in which the reinsurers themselves lay off  (retrocede) part of the risk that
they have taken on.
In the case of catastrophe risk, for example the risk of a loss accumulation resulting
from a single event such as a windstorm
9, reinsurance or retrocession normally takes
the form of  excess of loss (XL) contracts:  that is, the reinsurer (retrocessionaire)
agrees to meet losses due to claims in excess of a deductible retained by the primary
insurer or reinsurer.  Thus if the catastrophe occurs, the first round of claims is borne
                                               
7 Or some comparable estimate of  “extreme” loss, such as the maximum possible loss (MPL) or
estimated maximum loss (EML).
8 “Large” in this context has to be judged by reference to the capital resources of the insurer
concerned: large insurance companies can accept risks in their entirety, whereas individual small
companies or Lloyd’s syndicates would be able to accept only a part.
9 The term catastrophe  may also be applied to a very large loss from a single risk, such as  the
destruction of the Piper Alpha oil platform.3
by the primary insurers.  These then make claims on their reinsurers to recover
amounts - up to the limit of their reinsurance cover - in excess of their deductibles; and
the reinsurers in turn  make claims
10 on the retrocessionaires for claims in excess of
their (the reinsurers’) deductibles.  The process continues until there are no further
reinsurance
11 claims,  by which point the losses (i.e. net claims) borne by the insurers
and reinsurers involved must in aggregate equal the total insured losses.
Excess of loss reinsurance is typically placed in layers, that is one reinsurer will
provide cover for a layer of claims in excess of the primary insurer’s deductible, a
second for a layer of cover if claims should exceed the threshold provided by the
primary insurer’s deductible plus the first layer of cover, and so on. This practice helps
to disperse the risk inherent in large losses by bringing in more insurers, and it also
contributes to specialisation in risk-bearing because the  returns earned from writing
the higher layers of reinsurance are more volatile than those from writing lower layers:
while in most years there will be no claims that “invade” the higher layers, when claims
do occur they are likely to be large in relation to the premiums paid in that year.
12   The
reinsurance premiums normally decline for successively higher layers of cover, because
the probability of a claim invading any given layer reflects the (normally diminishing)
probability that the insured losses will exceed the relevant threshold  and because
claims administration costs associated with the higher layers of cover are relatively
small
13.
In order to determine how much reinsurance cover they require, underwriters have to
make an estimate of the PML of their insurance portfolio.  In the case of a single
installation, such as an oil platform, insured losses equal to the insurance cover granted
may be contemplated - in which case the PML would equal the total cover- though
insurers may take the view that the risk of a total loss for a single property can be
discounted and that the PML can therefore be set at a lower level.  For a catastrophe
such as a windstorm or earthquake,  where there is a potential agglomeration of losses,
the PML is likely to be less than 100% of the aggregate cover under the relevant
policies.  In a diversified  insurance portfolio, in which the degree of correlation
between the individual risks has been controlled, the PML will reflect that
diversification and be much less than the aggregate of the insured risks
14.
In conjunction with the amount of risk that the underwriter wants to retain, the PML
determines the underwriter’s perceived need for reinsurance cover. To guard against
                                               
10 Up to the limit of their cover.
11 Henceforth the term reinsurance includes retrocession.
12 For similar reasons,  the provision of retrocession cover is riskier than the provision of reinsurance
for the same insured event.
13 In economic terms the fair  premium for any given layer reflects the expected value of claims and
associated administration costs plus a return on the capital at risk. The volatility of the outcome
should affect the return on capital only to the extent that the risk is non-diversifiable, but in practice
inelasticity of supply of  (high) risk-bearing capacity has meant that premiums paid for the higher and
more volatile layers of cover allowed for an above-normal expected return on capital.  These abnormal
expected returns are likely to be eroded by the development of catastrophe insurance bonds, which
increase the supply of  risk-bearing capital.
14 A key skill of the insurance underwriter is to judge the PML of a portfolio of insurance policies, and
indeed to structure insurance portfolios so that, through diversification, the degree of correlation
between the risks is controlled.4
the risk of agglomeration losses an underwriter seeks single event  XL cover, that is
cover against the risk that the total claims from a particular class of business (e.g.
marine or household insurance) as a result of a single event exceed an agreed level (the
deductible), and/or whole account XL cover, that provides similar protection against
all types of insured losses (e.g. property, motor etc.)  Reinsurers in turn may seek  (XL
on XL ) cover from retrocessionaires.  Again, this reinsurance cover is normally
purchased in layers.
The protection provided by such cover is not unlimited  - it enables insurers to recover
losses in excess of their deductibles only up to the limit of their reinsurance.
Moreover, while losses beyond the PML  should be  improbable they are seldom
inconceivable.  Thus there is generally a possibility of PML failure, with insured losses
exceeding the estimated PML and the insurer having to carry the excess losses.
1.3 The incidence of losses  and the level of claims
In normal circumstances losses arising from single events are borne by primary
insurers, reinsurers and retrocessionaires in accordance with their deductibles, the
higher layers of cover being invaded only if the losses are sufficiently large.
15 However,
in the case of insurance portfolios for which  the  PMLs are less than the theoretical
maximum aggregate cover granted, insurers at all stages in the process run the risk of
experiencing losses in excess of their deductibles.  This will occur whenever the total
claims on them exceed their deductibles plus reinsurance cover.  If some insurers suffer
PML failure before others have exhausted their cover, the distribution of losses across
insurers will not reflect their intended exposure.
One consequence of the practice of dispersing risk through reinsurance is that the total
gross value of claims exceeds the total insured losses whenever losses are  sufficiently
large to trigger reinsurance claims.  Suppose that a risk is placed by the subscription
method amongst a number of insurers, that each primary insurer retains 50% of the
cover granted as a deductible and reinsures the other 50% on an excess of loss basis,
that each reinsurer does likewise, and that retrocessionaires retain 100% of the risk
that they accept.  A loss event resulting in insured losses of up to 50% of the cover
granted will be retained entirely by the primary insurers: gross claims equal total
insured losses.  In the case of a loss event resulting in insured losses equal to between
50% and 75% of the cover granted, the excess over 50% will result in claims on the
reinsurers.  Thus the loss event gives rise to gross claims that exceed the insured losses
by the amount of these reinsurance claims.  For losses between 75% and 100% of the
cover granted, reinsurers will seek to recover losses in excess of  75% from the
retrocessionaires, adding a further round of claims.  The result is that an insured loss
amounting to 100% of the available cover would give rise to gross claims equal to
175% of the losses
16.  In general, even in the absence of a spiral, the relationship
                                               
15 Assuming that there is no “spiral” exposure (see below) and that reinsurance cover up to the
maximum insured loss is in place.
16 Insured losses of 100 would give rise to gross claims on primary insurers of 100, on reinsurers of
50, and on retrocessionaires of 25,  with corresponding net claims (i.e. retained losses) of 50, 25 and
25 respectively.   Note that this example assumes that no insurer is involved at more than one stage of
the process.5
between the total gross claims generated by a loss event and the level of insured losses
depends on the structure of the primary, reinsurance and retrocession contracts
involved.
2 CHARACTERISTICS OF  INSURANCE SPIRALS
In a normal situation when an insurer (or reinsurer) makes a claim on a reinsurance
policy it has purchased the recovery does not lead to any further claims on that insurer.
In an insurance market spiral, however,  claims made by reinsurers
17 at one level result
in the same reinsurers receiving additional claims under reinsurance policies that they
have written.  Since the reinsurers in question have already received claims in excess of
their deductibles from the particular loss event,  provided that they have sufficient
reinsurance cover in place the additional claims they receive then trigger further claims
by them on higher layers of reinsurance cover.   This situation is likely to occur when
reinsurers seek to protect their own positions by purchasing XL reinsurance cover, and
at the same time write XL reinsurance policies for other reinsurers who are liable to be
affected by the same loss events.
In practice spirals are most likely to occur when reinsurers provide cover for each
other on similar lines of business, when the bulk of the relevant reinsurance is XL
business and when retrocession business includes cover for claims arising from XL
business (i.e. it is XL on XL business).  In these conditions the reinsurance claims
generated from insured losses in excess of the primary  insurers’ and reinsurers’
deductibles are passed on in full,
18 and continue to recirculate until some reinsurers run
out of cover.  These conditions applied to syndicates at Lloyd’s and many other
members of  the London Market in the second half of the 1980s: they participated in
both direct and reinsurance business, and provided mutual reinsurance and retrocession
cover for each other, with the result that claims arising from the same loss event were
passed to and fro within the group
19.
Insurance spirals thus serve  to concentrate, rather than disperse, risk.  Contrast the
following situations.  In the first, European reinsurers retrocede part of their European
(XL) windstorm risk to Japanese reinsurers, while the latter retrocede part of their
Japanese (XL) windstorm risk to European reinsurers.  Because the risks of
windstorms in Europe and Japan are independent,  the retrocession
20  helps to disperse
risk.  In the second case, suppose that the Japanese reinsurers retrocede part of the
European windstorm risk back to the European reinsurers.  In this case the
retrocession helps to concentrate risk, because if there is  a European windstorm the
claims experienced by the European reinsurers will reflect not only the original claims
of the primary insurers on them, but also the claims that they made on the Japanese
reinsurers, part of which will return to them.
                                               
17 Or direct insurers who also write reinsurance business.
18 Theoretically, a spiral  could occur even if all reinsurance was proportional,  though in that case the
fact that a significant proportion of the risk was retained at each round would limit its extent.
19 When primary insurance and reinsurance are handled by separate departments, avoiding
duplication of this kind depends on having a very effective system of management controls.
20 Which is XL on XL business.6
Insurance spirals are characterised by PML failure.  Once the insurers’ and reinsurers’
deductibles have been exhausted, any further losses remain in the spiral until the top
layer of some reinsurer’s own reinsurance cover runs out.  At that point any such
reinsurer must, involuntarily, retain the loss.   This adds to the concentration of risk,
because within any insurance market losses through PML failure tend to be
concentrated on those reinsurers whose reinsurance cover runs out first, rather than
being dispersed widely throughout that market.
In an insurance spiral the direct connection between the level of insured losses and the
triggering of claims on any given layer of reinsurance is broken.  The total of claims is
inflated by the recirculation of claims amongst insurers.
21   Because the reinsurance is
generally purchased in layers, whenever an insurer’s retentions have been exceeded but
its  reinsurance cover has not been exhausted, the further reinsurance claims arising
from a single loss event are passed on in full, so that even a relatively minor
catastrophe may trigger claims under relatively high layers of reinsurance cover.
22
Thus a further consequence of an insurance market spiral is that  the normal
relationship between the layer of reinsurance cover and the probability of a claim being
made is subverted.  If claims are passed from lower to higher layers of reinsurance
cover in full, instead of premiums being materially lower for high than for low layers of
cover they should, in principle, remain constant.
23  Moreover, when the link between
the size of the original loss and the probability of a claim being made on any layer of
reinsurance is broken,  it is impossible to make an objective estimate of the probability
of a claim without detailed knowledge of the structure of the intervening reinsurance
                                               
21 Claims arising  from the Piper Alpha disaster are said to have amounted to some 10 times the
insured losses. [Walker (1992), paragraph 2.14]
22 An example of how this process operates is contained in Gooda Walker (1992) (p. 11):
“Insurer A writes a direct account and decides he needs reinsurance protection of $9m in excess of
$1m.  He buys this reinsurance protection 100% from insurer B in nine layers of $1m in each.  Insurer
B also writes a direct account and decides that he needs reinsurance protection in the sum of $9m in
excess of $1m.  He buys this 100% from insurer A in nine layers of $1m each.  The situation at this
moment is that A and B are each other’s reinsurers.  Let us suppose that A now writes one direct risk
with an exposure of $3m.
Insurer A is now notified of a claim for $3m from the direct risk written which he subsequently pays.
He must suffer the $1m net (the deductible under his reinsurance programme) but can claim the
excess $2m from reinsurer B.  Having paid $2m to A, reinsurer B retains a net loss of $1m (the
deductible under B’s reinsurance programme) and claims the excess $1m as a reinsurance claim on A.
Reinsurer A has already dealt with a claim on this original loss totalling $3m and treats the further
claim as part of the same original loss.  He pays the claim and then makes a reinsurance recovery of
$1m from B.  Cumulative gross payments by A at this point are $4m from the original loss of $3m.
Reinsurer B pays the claim of $1m to A who in turn pays a claim of another $1m to B.  This process
continues with A retaining $1m at the bottom of  his programme and B retaining $1m at the bottom
of his programme.  In total, A and B claim $9m and $8m respectively from each other as the claim
moves through the spiral.  Ultimately insurer A is left with a $1m claim from B which he cannot
recover  through reinsurance because A runs out of reinsurance first.  At the end of the process
therefore the original loss of $3m has fallen $2m net to A and $1m net to B.  Cumulative gross claims
payments total $11m for A and $9m for
B.  [Volume 1, chapter 2, paragraphs 7.2.1 and 7.2.2]
23If claims are not passed on in full, premiums should fall to the extent that claims passing through to
higher rounds are eroded by deductibles.7
contracts.  In reality, acquiring the necessary detailed knowledge is unlikely to be
practicable for retrocession business 
24, particularly when the subscription method of
placing business multiplies the number of contracts and reduces the transparency of the
underlying insurance contracts.
Finally, the capacity of an insurance market for risk can be measured by the sum of the
deductibles of the insurers and reinsurers in the market with regard to that risk.
Beyond their deductibles the insurers and reinsurers purchase reinsurance cover up to
their PMLs. Thus, if a loss occurs that is greater than the sum of all the insurers’ and
reinsurers’ deductibles, PML failure is unavoidable -  some  insurers’ or reinsurers’
PMLs must prove to be too low.  When a spiral exists, even PMLs  that are a
substantial multiple of the maximum credible original loss may prove to be
inadequate.
25 It is in the nature of a PML that it is an estimate of  the maximum loss
that can reasonably be expected to arise from the insurer’s portfolio, and in the absence
of the information necessary to calculate the PMLs with any precision in these
conditions, it will hardly be surprising if some insurers get it wrong. Indeed, if insurers
accept risks for which the market does not have sufficient capacity on the basis that
they can lay off the surplus risk through reinsurance, in the event of a sufficiently large
insured loss PML failure for some market participants is inevitable.
3 MODELLING THE SPIRAL
3.1 A General Model
Assume that there is a group of m “inside” reinsurers within a market, who reinsure
business with each other.  Assume further that they place some of their reinsurance
outside the market, and that none of that reinsurance is retroceded back into the
market i.e. it is all retained outside the market.  For simplicity insurers outside the
market can be treated as a single, (m+1) th,  “outside” reinsurer.   Let the i’th inside
reinsurer have a retention Di,  i = 1....m ,  and let it purchase reinsurance  Ri.  Let Rij
be the reinsurance cover purchased by the i’th reinsurer from the j’th reinsurer
( i =  1....(m+1) )
26.  Since no reinsurer purchases cover from itself, it follows that:
                    m+1
Ri  = S  Rij                                                             Rii = 0
                     
j=1
The cover provided by the j’th inside reinsurer is:
             m
S  Rij
            
i=1
                                               
24 Consequently, as a matter of policy some major reinsurance companies generally did not accept XL
on XL business [Phillips (1994) p. 31]
25 Of course, PML failure may also be due to insurers underestimating the maximum amount of the
original losses, and unintended losses may also be experienced as a result of  insurers failing to
purchase sufficient reinsurance to protect losses of up to their PMLs.
26 For simplicity, the effect of layering is ignored, i.e. the reinsurers are assumed to subscribe the same
proportion of all the layers of any reinsurance programme.8
and the cover provided by the outside reinsurer is:
             m
S  Ri,(m+1)
            
i=1
Now suppose that the inside reinsurers receive claims of (Xi + Di) in respect of a loss
event, where 0  <  Xi  <  Ri  for all i.
The i’th inside reinsurer seeks to recover Xi from its reinsurers and accordingly claims
      Xi [Rij / Ri],  j = 1, .... ,(m+1)
from the j’th reinsurer.  The total such claims received by the j’th reinsurer are
therefore:
 m
S Xi [ Rij / Ri],   j = 1, .... ,(m+1)
i=1
At this point the j’th inside reinsurer has received gross claims in respect of the loss
event amounting to:
         m
Xj + Dj  +  S  Xi [ Rij / Ri ],  and provided that
                             
i=1
                       m
Xj +   S Xi  [Rij / Ri ] <  Rj
                      
i=1
it is entitled to recover a further
              m
 S     Xi  [Rij / Ri ],
             
i=1
from its reinsurers.  Of this amount, only the claims falling on the outside reinsurer,
                m
namely    S Xi [Ri,(m+1) / Ri ]
               
i=1
are not recirculated.  As a result, at the next round, reinsurer i receives claims
amounting to:
               m                        m
  S [Rji / Rj] S Xi [Rij / Ri ]
              
j=1                      i=1
                m                                    m
with    S  [Rj, (m+1) / Rj] S Xi [ Rij /  Ri ]
               
j=1                                  i=1
falling on the outside reinsurer.
This process continues until one of the following occurs.9
1 The total claims on the outside reinsurer amount to
           m
 S Xi    -  i.e. to the total insured losses covered by the inside reinsurers less
           
i=1
their deductibles - before any inside reinsurer has exhausted its reinsurance
cover, Ri.  In this case, the cumulative claims on the i’th inside reinsurer cannot
exceed Ri + Di , for all i.
2 The reinsurance cover of one or more inside reinsurers is exhausted before the
reinsured part of the losses has been passed in full to the outside reinsurer.  From
this point on the inside reinsurer in question is in the same position as the outside
reinsurer, having to retain any further claims falling on it.  Total retentions at
each subsequent round are then divided between the relevant inside reinsurers
and the outside reinsurers in proportion to the claims falling on them.
3 The reinsurance cover of all the inside reinsurers is exhausted.  At this point the
part of the initial loss that has not already been retained is divided between the
inside reinsurers in proportion to the final round of claims on them.
It follows that the existence of mutual reinsurance within an insurance market does not
necessarily lead to unintended losses: so long as there are outside reinsurers willing
and able to participate in the reinsurance, and the insiders arrange sufficient
reinsurance cover, losses in excess of the insiders’ deductibles will in the end be borne
by the outsiders.  However, because the spiral inflates the level of gross claims, the
level of  reinsurance required to achieve this may be very high; and if outside insurers
are less willing to provide high layers of cover than insiders, the end-result is that
insiders will be left to carry the residual losses.
3.2 A Simplified Model
While the general model demonstrates the complexity to which interdependent, mutual
reinsurance arrangements give rise, it is too general to provide useful results.  To
simplify matters let us assume therefore that there are three groups of insurers,
outsiders and two groups of insiders, who behave as follows: the outsiders accept risk,
but do not reinsure (at least with insiders); the first group of insiders reinsure up to a
certain level, but are prepared to accept higher layers of reinsurance from other
insurers; and the second group of insiders write and reinsure up to the same level.
Specifically, let us assume that there are a large number, n, of  reinsurers, all of equal
size
27, that the fraction  a  are outside the relevant group, and that the insiders fall into
two groups comprising the fractions  b1 and b2   of the insiders,  ( i.e. b1 +  b2  =  1 ).
Assume that insiders have reinsurance cover in place of R1 and R2  (R2 > R1)
respectively, but that both groups subscribe to all layers of reinsurance cover up to R2.
Assume also that each outside reinsurer subscribes to layers of  cover up to a
maximum of R0, and that R0 < R1 , i.e. that the outside reinsurers participate only in the
                                               
27 This involves no loss of generality, as large reinsurers can be considered as consisting of the
appropriate number of the standard size of reinsurer.  If this standard size is assumed to be small,
then the numbers of both inside and outside reinsurers can be treated as large, and the fact that
reinsurers do not place any  reinsurance directly with themselves can be ignored.10
lower layers of reinsurance programmes.  Finally, without loss of generality, assume
that the insiders’ deductibles, D1 and D2  respectively,  are both zero, so that the
original loss, X, experienced by each inside reinsurer is fed through in full into its first
round claim on other reinsurers.
Case 1
Suppose that the cover provided by the outside reinsurers has not been exhausted.
Of the first round claim the proportion  (1 - a ) falls on inside reinsurers and  a  falls
on outside reinsurers. The second round claim made by each inside reinsurer will then
be  (1 -a)X, and the spiral will continue with claims at the k’th round of  (1 - a)
k-1X.
After k rounds the total claims by each inside reinsurer will therefore be
X [1 + (1 - a) + ...... +(1 - a)
k-1]
    =     [X/a] [1 - (1 - a)
k]
The limit of the cover provided by the outsiders is R0, so the process can continue so
long as
[X/a] [1 - (1 - a)
k]  <  R0
or (1 - a)
k > 1 -  aR0/X
Since the outsiders subscribe the fraction a of  each layer of cover for the insiders, the
cover provided by outsiders for each insider is aR0.  If the insider’s original loss, X, is
less than  aR0, the right-hand side of this expression is negative, and there is no
theoretical upper limit on k.  Thus within this range of loss the spiral of claims
(becoming smaller at each round) can continue indefinitely, and in the end the entire
loss will be met by the outside reinsurers
28.
Case 2
If the original loss is greater than the cover provided by outsiders, i.e.  X > aR0,  then
the right hand side of the expression is positive. It follows that there is an upper limit
to k, reached when the level of claims by each inside reinsurer equals R0,  at which
point the reinsurance cover provided by outsiders will be exhausted.
Each inside reinsurer has by then recovered (net)  aR0  of its original loss, X,  so that
the next round of  claims (now falling only on the inside reinsurers) amounts to
X - aR0   =  Z
                                               
28 The total of the claims generated by each inside reinsurer, including the original claim of X , is
X[1 + 1/a] , up to a maximum of  aR0[1 + 1/a] = R0[1 + a]11
Since there are no more retentions until some inside reinsurers run out of cover, claims
at this level are passed on in full and ascend the spiral amongst the inside reinsurers
until the total claims by each inside reinsurer have reached R1 , at which point  the first
group of inside reinsurers exhaust their reinsurance cover and are unable to pass on
any outstanding or further claims.
29
However, the two groups of inside reinsurers are now in different positions.  The first
group have run out of reinsurance cover, and have to retain (involuntarily) any
outstanding claims or further claims on them.  The second group continue to be able to
pass on claims until they reach the limit of  their reinsurance cover, namely R2.
In effect, as regards further participation in the spiral, the first group have become
outsiders, whilst the second group remain as insiders.
The cover purchased by each of the second group from the first group is b1[R2 - R1].
Thus within the range of original loss given by
aR0 < X <  aR0 +  b1[R2 - R1]
or 0 < Z < b1[R2 -R1]
the first group have to retain not only their own net losses when they run out of
reinsurance cover, Z, but also the further reinsurance claims from the second group.
For each member of the first group these additional claims amount to [b2/b1] Z,
30
giving total losses of  Z [1 + b2/b1].
Case 3
The second group of inside reinsurers runs out of reinsurance cover when
Z = b1[R2 - R1] ,
at which point the involuntary losses borne by each of the first group amount to
[R2 -R1] .
If the original loss exceeds this threshold  the balance is retained by the reinsurer.
Thus for
X >  [aR0 + b1(R2 - R1)]
the losses borne by each of the first group are
[R2 -R1]  + {X - [aR0 + b1(R2 - R1)] }
                                               
29 At this point the total claims generated by each inside reinsurer amount to
R0[1 + a] + [R1 - R0] = [R1  + aR0]
5 Within this range the additional claims generated by each of the second group of inside reinsurers
amount to  Z/b1  , up to a maximum of [R2  - R1]12
and by the second group are
{X - [aR0 + b1(R2 - R1)] }
 3.3 Illustrative Example
The incidence of losses across all the reinsurers is illustrated in the following example.
Suppose that insurance cover is provided for damage to (including the complete
destruction of) an oil rig, with a maximum potential liability of $1200m.   Suppose that
it is provided by 200 insurers (the insiders), each of unit size, who provide $6m of
cover each.  Suppose further that each inside insurer retains the first $1m of loss and
buys XL reinsurance (in layers) to cover the other $5m of  potential loss.  The first
three layers of $0.5m reinsurance are spread equally amongst each of the inside
insurers and 100 outside reinsurers (i.e. R0 = $1.5m), while the next $3.5m are
provided equally by all the insiders (R1 =  $5m).  Finally, suppose that 50 of the
insiders (group 1) do not purchase any further reinsurance, but that the other 150
(group 2) purchase additional reinsurance cover up to $10m (R2 = $10m), this being
provided equally by all the insiders.
Chart 1 shows the loss retained by each insurer if an insured loss of $Xm is incurred.






















































Insured losses of up to $200m are covered by the deductibles of the inside insurers and
are absorbed (voluntarily) by them.  The next $100m of insured losses fall entirely on
the outsiders: within this range insiders are able eventually to recover from the
outsiders any losses in excess of their deductibles.  Losses in the range $300-550m fall
entirely on the first group of inside reinsurers - as  a result of the spiral any insured loss
in excess of $1.5m for each insider (i.e. $300m in total)  leads to reinsurance claims of
more than $5m and so exhausts the first group’s cover.  These involuntary losses have
to be added to their deductibles of $1m.  Any insured loss beyond $550m (i.e. original
claims of $2.75m) falls on  both groups of insiders because at this point their $10m of
























































Chart 2 illustrates how the total level of claims is magnified in the course of the spiral.
Since the first $200m of claims from an insured loss are retained by the insurers any
loss up to that amount does not give rise to reinsurance claims: total claims are
therefore equal to the insured loss.  Thereafter the total claims rise rapidly.  For an
insured loss of between $200m and $300m, only 1/3 of any reinsurance claims are
retained by outsiders, with the balance leading to further claims - in this range the
addition to claims is 4 times the additional insured loss, so that an insured loss of
$300m generates total claims of $600m.  At this point total claims rise precipitously -
by another $700m - before any further losses are retained (e.g. insured losses of $301m
would generate total claims of just over $1300m). Further losses in the range $300 -
550m generate claims amounting to 4 times the additional losses,  taking the total of
claims to $2300m.    Since insured losses of $550m exhaust the reinsurance cover of
all the insurers, higher levels of insured loss do not generate any further reinsurance
claims, so that gross claims rise only in line with the insured loss.
3.4 Other participants in spiral business
The simplified model and illustration above actually understate the possible extent of
spiral business because they omit one important category of reinsurer.  So far the
insurers considered in the models have behaved in one of the three ways set out at the
beginning of section 3.2.  However, there is also a fourth group to consider - inside
reinsurers who accept layers of reinsurance up to one level but purchase sufficient
reinsurance at higher levels to ensure that their own exposure to unintended losses
does not increase. Business written by such reinsurers adds to the total level of claims
in the spiral
31.
It is worthwhile asking how it can be profitable for an underwriter to write such
business, when in practice taking little, or even no, risk. There are two sets of
conditions in which it may occur.
                                               
31 Reinsurers in this fourth category provide capacity only to the extent that they retain some of the
risk themselves, i.e. to the extent that the reinsurance purchased is less than the  reinsurance accepted.
Thus the volume of claims in the spiral is inflated by the amount of the reinsurance purchased.14
First, an underwriter’s own whole account XL reinsurance arrangements may be put in
place before the business for the period in question is written.  If there is excess
capacity in the market and it is difficult to win business the underwriter may be in a
position to write more business without exceeding the PML on which his reinsurance
arrangements have been based.  In this situation additional business, even at marginal
rates, makes a contribution to profits without unintended exposure to risk.
The second set of conditions depends on an irrational pricing structure for successive
layers of  XL reinsurance cover.  In normal circumstances the risk of catastrophe
losses of a given amount diminishes as the size of  the losses increases, with the
premiums charged reflecting the diminishing probability of loss
32.  The existence of a
spiral modifies the normal relationship as regards the probability of loss, but is not
necessarily associated with a corresponding change in the premium structure.
The effect of a spiral on the probability of loss is complex, as can be illustrated by
reference to Chart 2 above.  For relatively small losses that fall within the insurers’
own retentions the spiral does not  operate, and no modification is required.  For the
lowest layers of reinsurance (i.e. up to R0), where the losses will ultimately be borne by
outsiders,  the probability of a claim of a given size is magnified by the spiral.  In this
range the probability of any given layer being invaded by a claim continues to diminish
with the height of the layer, but in comparison with a non-spiral situation it does so at
a reduced rate, the degree of the reduction depending on the extent to which claims fall
on outside rather than inside reinsurers.   For the layers between R0 and R1,  the
probability of a  claim does not diminish at all, because any claim that invades the
lowest of these layers passes through in full into the layer above R1.  Finally, in the
layers between R1 and R2, the probability of a claim again diminishes, because the first
group of insiders retain unintended losses, though at a rate that reflects the fact that a
proportion of the claims (those on the second-group) are recycled into higher layers.
Rational pricing of successive layers of reinsurance would  therefore have to take
account, not only of the probability of loss events of particular sizes occurring, but also
of the structure of claims within the reinsurance market.  When a spiral structure exists
in the market, the probability of a claim invading any given layer is much higher than
when there is no spiral, and in the absence of significant retentions from the claims on
each layer,  the diminution of risk from one layer to the next is minimal.  In practice
there is unlikely to be enough  information available to reinsurers in such conditions to
enable them to price business rationally
33.
If the existence and implications of spiral business are not fully recognised in the
market, the conventional premium structure may be maintained, with the higher layers
of cover being placed at rates that are unjustifiably low in relation to the risks involved.
It is then possible for some underwriters to participate in spiral business profitably and
                                               
32 On the assumption that the greater volatility associated with the higher layers of  cover warrants a
higher expected return,  premiums should  theoretically fall by less than in proportion to the expected
value of the loss.
33 See Institute of Actuaries (1988), 2: “....it is now almost impossible to analyse the contents of the
book of business written by an underwriter in a subscription market; it is therefore not possible to
quantify exposure....” (p. 125).15
risklessly  by placing high layers of reinsurance at premiums lower than they can obtain
for the lower layers they themselves accept.
34
4 THE LLOYD’S INSURANCE SPIRALS
It is not difficult to point to a number of features of the Lloyd’s and London Markets
that contributed to the development of reinsurance spirals in the second half of the
1980s.
First, there was very little participation in the market for XL retrocession business
outside of the London Market
35:  in terms of the model of section 3.2, a was small.
The scope for London underwriters to pass on risk to other markets was
correspondingly limited, and risks accepted by the London Market tended to be
retained within the market..
Secondly, many underwriters at Lloyd’s “retained a very low retention and bought
reinsurance to improve their premium to risk position”
36:  In terms of the model of
section 3.1, D was frequently very small.  As a result, even moderate losses were likely
to exceed underwriters’ voluntary retentions and  set off a spiral of reinsurance claims
that penetrated the higher layers of reinsurance programmes.
Thirdly,  some underwriters miscalculated their PMLs because “even underwriters
engaged in LMX did not fully understand the effect of the spiral”
37, or because they
regarded “the higher layers of cover... as virtually risk-free”
38.  Their willingness to
accept  risks  without adequate reinsurance provided the retrocession cover required
by other participants in the spiral.   Their position is comparable to that of the second
group of inside reinsurers in section 3.2 above.
Fourthly, some underwriters  accepted business that led to an increase in their PMLs
without having sufficient reinsurance cover in place, because of “unexpected demand
for cover at attractive rates”
39,  “demands for reciprocity”
40, and financial constraints
on the amount of premium income spent on reinsurance
41 .  Their position may be
compared to that of the first group of reinsurers in section 3.2 above
                                               
34 Such  “irrational” pricing structures appear to have existed in the London Market in the reinsurance
spirals of the late 1980s.
35 “The only market for a reinsurance of an LMX underwriter is to all intents and purposes the LMX
market itself.  The amounts placed overseas are insignificant and are in any case often reinsured on a
similar basis back in London.”  [Paper by Mr Outhwaite, quoted in Phillips (1994), p 60}
36 Walker (1992), paragraph 2.15.
37 Response of Mr Crane quoted in  Gatehouse (1994), p.18
38 Phillips (1994), p. 86.
39 Attributed to Mr Gofton-Salmond in Phillips (1995), p.88
40  It has been suggested that, in order to place their own reinsurance cover in the market ,
underwriters had to be prepared  to accept similar reinsurance business placed by others.  See for
example Walker (1992), paragraph 3.24, “The committee  believe that active underwriters on several
of the loss-making LMX syndicates were heavily influenced by LMX brokers.”
41 Phillips (1995), pp 54-5516
Fifthly, the premium structure for successive layers of spiral business did not  reflect
the true risk of loss - “the upper layers ... were grossly underrated”.
42  This provided
scope for underwriters who fully understood the spiral to participate profitably in spiral
business by taking advantage of the disparity between rates for low level and high level
layers of business
43, as suggested in section 3.4 above.  Moreover, other reinsurers
were able to retrocede risk into the London Market at attractive rates, thus increasing
London’s share of world-wide exposure to catastrophe losses.
These features may all be regarded as proximate causes of the Lloyd’s insurance
spirals. The consequence was a very substantial increase in XL reinsurance and
retrocession business, including inter-syndicate reinsurance, within Lloyd’s.  Gross
premium income of “LMX” syndicates
44 identified by the Walker Committee rose from
13.1% of Lloyd’s total gross premium income in 1983 to 26.4% in 1990, and by the
late 1980s many other syndicates also had some involvement in  XL retrocession
business.  As regards spiral business within Lloyd’s itself
45, gross inter-syndicate
reinsurance premiums as a proportion of Lloyd’s total gross premiums rose from 9.1%
in 1984 to 16.1% in 1990.
46   The end-result, when the catastrophes occurred, was
losses on a scale that threatened the continued existence of Lloyd’s.
                                               
42 Phillips (1995), p. 108
43 Phillips (1994), p.68
44 Syndicates treated by the Walker Committee as writing significant amounts of LMX (XL
retrocession)  business.
45 The spirals also included business amongst  Lloyd’s syndicates and other insurers in the London
Market, and, to a lesser extent, insurers elsewhere.
46 Quoted in Cresswell (1996), pp. 77-8.17
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